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Introduction
During the first era of financial globalization between 1880 and 1914 international capital mobility was as high as today. The Feldstein-Horioka (1980) test even suggests that capital movements were higher in the historical era (Bayoumi, 1990; Eichengreen, 1990; Taylor, 1996; Jones and Obstfeld, 1997 ). Yet the patterns of international capital flows differ markedly between the two periods of largely unrestricted capital mobility. Before WW1 capital flows were predominantly one-directional in the sense that capital flowed from the rich core economies in Europe to the poorer periphery on a net basis. As a consequence, the rich creditor nations in the core had built up substantial net foreign asset positions of around 20 percent of their aggregate GDP, and by 1914 foreign capital to output ratios averaged more than 100 percent in developing countries (Edelstein, 1982; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Schularick, 2006) . In the contemporary globalization, gross capital mobility is equally high, but does not lead to substantial net capital flows between rich and poor economies. As a result, the Lucas (1990) paradox of missing rich-poor capital flows is more pronounced than in the first globalization. 1 In their important study, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, p. 55) concluded that the contemporary financial globalization was characterized by "diversification finance" as opposed to "development finance" before WW1:
Today's foreign asset distribution is much more about asset "swapping" by rich countriesdiversification -than it is about the accumulation of large one-way positions-a critical component of the development process in poorer countries in standard textbook treatments.
How can we account for these differences between now and then? Why was capital market integration before 1914 marked by massive net capital flows to poor economies while the contemporary globalization is characterized by diversification finance and limited net capital movements? In this paper, we aim to sketch a potential theoretical explanation for this phenomenon along the lines of Lucas' thinking about determinants of rate of return differentials between developed and less developed economies. In his seminal paper, Lucas (1990) argued that differences in the relative human capital endowments could be an 1 While Clemens and Williamson (2004) found that the wealth bias of financial investment was as strong before 1914, other studies have questioned the robustness of this result after controlling for outliers and pointed to a much less pronounced "wealth bias" in international capital flows before WW1 (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Schularick, 2006) . This also mirrors the earlier findings by Edelstein (1982) who had shown substantial net investment flows from Europe to overseas areas. explanation for the absence of substantial net capital movements from rich and poor countries during the post-WW2 period. In Lucas' original line of thought, physical capital is comparably unproductive in poor countries because complementary factors such as human capital are missing. This perspective can be referred to as the "unproductive capital view".
The alternative position, the "capital market failure view", stresses factors such as asymmetric information, distorting policies, and unenforceable property rights. This strand of the literature highlights the quality of institutions -such as the protection of creditors and the enforcement of property rights across international borders -as a necessary condition for net investment flows and the buildup of sizeable net foreign asset positions (Shleifer, 2003) .
Recent empirical studies have pointed to the important contribution legal and political arrangements made to development finance before 1913 by increasing creditor protection and borrowers willingness to pay (Ferguson, 2003; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005a; Ferguson and Schularick, 2006) . Weak institutions have also been made responsible for the paucity of The "unproductive capital view" and the "capital market failure view" are by no means mutually exclusive. We therefore ask whether a combination of these two approaches is capable of explaining the different patterns of international capital flows during the two eras of financial globalization within a unified framework. In a first step, we extend Lucas'
(1990) original model to account for the impact of institutional quality on rate of return differentials between rich and poor countries. In a second step, we evaluate the model using modern and historical data to see what difference in the quality of institutions between rich and poor countries could explain the observed patterns of capital flows. Finally, we check the plausibility of these results against the available evidence on differentials in institutional quality between rich and poor countries in both eras of financial globalization.
This exercise shows that it is possible to explain why rich-poor capital movements are negligible in modern times but were substantial before WW1: we find a considerably higher rate of return differential between rich and poor countries for the historical period than for today.
An extended Lucas exercise
We start by extending the original Lucas (1990) framework to incorporate the effects of differences in institutional quality on rate of return differentials between rich and poor countries. Lucas himself proposed that institutional factors could play an important role for the paucity of capital flows from rich to poor (1990, pp. 94/95):
Until around 1945, much of the Third World was subject to European-imposed legal and economic arrangements, and had been so for decades or even centuries. A European lending to a borrower in India or the Dutch East Indies could expect his contract to be enforced with exactly the same effectiveness and by exactly the same means as a contract with domestic borrowers.
Assume, following Lucas (1990) , that the production technology is
technology parameters, h is human capital per capita, L (unskilled) labor, K represents the stock of physical capital, and h γ captures a production externality. Output per effective labor,
The competitive and private rate of return on capital may then be expressed as = for k and plugging the result into the previous expression for the rate of return, we get
Hence, the ratio of the rate of returns on capital in poor and rich countries may be expressed as follows:
where the subindex p stands for "poor" and r for "rich". Equation (1) shows that the rate of return differential, / (Barro and Lee, 2000) . In total, we count observations for 54 countries for the contemporary period covering a large number of developing and developed countries. Our analysis of the historical period builds on three recently compiled datasets for the first era of financial globalization (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Ferguson and Schularick, 2006) . From these datasets come all economic variables such as the human capital proxy (primary school enrollment). Real GDP data come from the seminal work of Angus Maddison (Maddison 1995 (Maddison , 2001 . Capital flow and foreign investment stock data are taken from the work of Stone (1999) as well as Feis (1965) and Woodruff (1966) . A detailed data appendix is available from the authors on request. In total, we have assembled data for 24 countries over covering more than 80 percent of global GDP in 1914. 2 Constructing average values for the rich and the poor half of the world results in a slightly higher relative human capital endowment in the historical period with poor-to-rich ratios of 0.45 back then versus 0.41 today. With regard to output differentials, we work with actual GDP per capita data for the modern period which show a rich-to-poor GDP per capita ratio of 0.25. However, this approach is problematic for the historical period as we know that substantial net capital movements between rich and poor haven taken place during the period.
As these flows are likely to have lowered the initial gap in output per capita, we need to adjust output per capita for the effects of the capital transfers.
Two additional assumptions are necessary. First, we follow Twomey (2000) and Schularick (2006, Second, we assume a capital-output ratio of three. On the basis of this information, we can calculate differences in GDP per capita between rich and poor countries under the counterfactual assumption that no capital had flown from rich to poor. 3 The calculation yields an original ex-ante output differential between poor and rich countries of 0.31. We also present our simulations below with the ex-post differences in GDP per capita of 0.36 to demonstrate the impact of these counterfactual assumptions.
It is inherently difficult to quantify the difference in institutional quality between rich and poor economies. In this paper, we consequently abstain from making direct assumptions, Middle Eastern (Egypt, Turkey/Ottoman Empire) economies. 3 A similar procedure has been recently applied in a historical study focusing on the effect of capital movements and mass migration on wage differentials by Hatton and Williams (2006) .
For the historical period, there are no detailed country-by-country assessments of institutional quality that could serve as comparable signposts to approximate the differences in institutional quality. However, it is clear that on the eve of WW1, most of Asia and Africa was under colonial rule by the European powers. European rule could have had an impact on contract enforcement by foreign investors as Lucas himself noted in the quote above. Did colonial status improve property rights and legal protection for foreign investors? Ferguson and Schularick (2006) Without formal guarantees by the British government, India's country risk premium as charged by the international bond market was two basis points lower than in the US -50 basis points. The average of the less-developed parts of the British Empire (including many poor African colonies) was 46 basis points. It seems therefore likely that colonial status contributed significantly to equalizing institutional and legal investment risks between rich and poor economies.
As for the other parts of the developing world that were not under formal colonial rule before WW1 such as Latin America and Eastern Europe, the recent literature argues that the European powers and the US policed and protected property rights by way of an informal imperialism (Kelly, 1998; Goetzmann and Ukhov, 2001) . In particular Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005a,b) show that military pressure and political control were an important and commonly used enforcement mechanism for international debt transactions in 1870-1913. It seems plausible to assume that such interventions and indirect political control have lowered sovereign risk and resulted in a higher relative degree of property rights protection in the periphery than today.
Evaluating the extended Lucas model
Using the parameters presented in table 1, we evaluate the model and plot the resulting rate of return differentials over the different ratios for institutional quality in graph 1. Looking at the modern period, lower GDP per capita in poor countries as implied by
, together with diminishing returns to capital creates a positive rate of return differential. Yet, as Lucas argued before, weaker human capital endowment reduces the rate of return differential. 4 However, the new insight from figure 1 is that in an extended
Lucas framework, i.e. accounting for differences in property rights protection, a positive rate of return differential between rich and poor economies appears only if the differential in property rights protection is at or above 0.6. Assuming the level of property rights protection in the periphery is 60 percent of the level developed world, rates of return in the periphery would be a mere 11 percent higher than in the core. Given the margin of error of our approximations in table 1, the resulting differential is hardly enough to conclude that ex ante rate of return differentials in the contemporary world economy are large enough to incite large capital flows. If the rate of return in the typical rich country amounts to, say, 5 percent, the rate of return in the typical poor country would be 5.55 percent. In addition, the evidence on relative property rights protection discussed above even indicates that the differential could have been lower, maybe only around 0.55. In this case, the rate of return differential between rich and poor economies over the past 25 years would have been a rather insignificant 2 percent. A figure low enough to explain the observed paucity of capital flows from rich to poor countries. 4 This result is qualitatively similar to Lucas (1990, p. 94) . The reason is that we set 
The underlying data set is described in section 3. (b) The construction of the counterfactual relative GDP per capita is described in a technical appendix available from the authors.
Evaluating (1) Figure 1 demonstrates that starting from a property rights differential in the vicinity of 0.75 a substantial ex ante rate of return differential appears for the historical period. The rate of return differential grows to almost 50 percent as we move closer towards the assumption of equal institutional quality in rich and poor countries ( / 1 As there were no impediments to capital mobility during the first era of globalization, this could be an indication that capital movements had eliminated substantial rate of return differentials by the end of the period.
Summing up, with higher relative institutional quality in the periphery before 1914 than today, an extended Lucas model suggests a substantial ex ante rate of return differential.
While difficult to quantify precisely, the assumption of higher institutional standards carries a high plausibility in light of the evidence presented on the "Empire Effect" and informal arrangements that enhanced creditor protection. For instance, if we generalize the above example of equal country risk premia for the US and India before WW1, the resulting ex ante rate of return differential between rich and poor countries in the first era of globalization reaches more than 50 percent. Assuming a not unrealistic differential of 0.9 still yields a substantial rate of return differential of 35 percent -high enough to incite substantial capital transfers from rich to poor before WW1 and hence explain the different patterns of financial globalization then vs. now. 
Summary
The markedly different patterns of international capital mobility during the historical and the modern era can be explained within an extended Lucas (1990) framework that combines the "unproductive capital" and the "capital market failure" views. Two assumptions are critical:
(1) the human capital externality in both periods is in the range [0.15, 0.2] γ ∈ ;
(2) the differential in institutional quality between rich and poor countries in the historical period was considerably higher than today, possibly around 0.9. While direct evidence on this last 
